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An Interdisciplinary Assessment of Military Communication, Information‑War, and Digital Authoritarianism
Abstract
Since the onset of the Russian‑Ukrainian war, the messaging platform Telegram has become a central conduit for operational coordination, morale‑building, and civilian‑military liaison on the Russian side of the front. In August 2023 the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) began throttling voice‑ and video‑call functionalities on the app; in February 2026 the agency announced a second wave of restrictions, citing the platform’s alleged failure to curb “criminal and terrorist activity.” The present paper offers a comprehensive, interdisciplinary analysis of how these curbs may affect Russian soldiers’ battlefield communications, psychological welfare, and command‑and‑control (C2) processes. Drawing on open‑source intelligence (OSINT), media‑content analysis, military‑communication theory, and the scholarship on digital authoritarianism, we argue that (i) Telegram’s technical architecture renders it uniquely suited for low‑latency, encrypted coordination; (ii) state‑imposed bandwidth throttling and functional bans degrade operational effectiveness and increase information‑asymmetry; (iii) the curbs risk eroding soldier morale by severing family contact and informal support networks; and (iv) the policy reflects a broader Kremlin strategy to re‑centralise information flow under state‑controlled channels, with implications for both domestic control and the conduct of hybrid warfare. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for mitigating adverse outcomes and for future research on the intersection of military operations and digital platform governance.
Keywords – Telegram, Russia, military communications, information warfare, digital authoritarianism, command‑and‑control, soldier morale, censorship.
- Introduction
The rapid diffusion of encrypted instant‑messaging applications has reshaped modern warfare, enabling non‑state actors and regular militaries alike to bypass traditional, often insecure, radio or satellite links (Kaufmann, 2020). In Russia, Telegram—founded in 2013 by the ex‑KGB operative Pavel Durov—has emerged as the de‑facto platform for both civilian discourse and military coordination (Shepherd, 2021). By early 2024, an estimated 70 % of Russian servicemen reported regular use of Telegram for receiving orders, sharing battlefield updates, and maintaining contact with relatives (Makarov & Yakovlev, 2024).
In August 2023 Roskomnadzor introduced a “technical limitation” that throttled voice‑ and video‑call functions on Telegram, ostensibly to curb illicit communications (Roskomnadzor, 2023). On 11 February 2026 the agency announced a second set of restrictions, threatening to further impair data transmission due to the platform’s alleged “insufficient cooperation” in eliminating extremist content (Roskomnadzor, 2026). The announcement triggered a swift backlash from soldiers, veteran associations, and pro‑Kremlin politicians who warned that the curbs could jeopardise front‑line effectiveness and soldiers’ mental health (Reuters, 2026).
This paper asks: What are the likely operational, psychological, and strategic consequences of Russia’s curbs on Telegram for its armed forces? To answer, we integrate three analytical lenses: (1) technical‑functional assessment of Telegram’s architecture and the nature of the imposed restrictions; (2) military‑communication theory, especially the concepts of network‑centric warfare and human‑in‑the‑loop C2; and (3) political‑digital authoritarianism, which explains the state’s motive to re‑centralise information flows.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews scholarly literature on digital platforms in warfare, state censorship of messaging apps, and the Russian information‑war ecosystem. Section 3 outlines the methodological approach, primarily a mixed‑methods OSINT and content‑analysis framework. Section 4 presents the findings, organized around (i) functional degradation of Telegram, (ii) impacts on operational coordination, (iii) soldier morale and family contact, and (iv) broader strategic implications. Section 5 discusses the results in light of existing theory and offers policy recommendations. Section 6 concludes with avenues for further research.
- Literature Review
2.1. Encrypted Messaging in Modern Conflict
The use of encrypted messaging platforms—WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, and others—has become ubiquitous in contemporary armed conflicts (Bennett & Lyon, 2020). Their appeal lies in low‑cost, low‑latency, peer‑to‑peer communication that can operate under congested or contested networks (Kaufmann, 2020). Studies on the Syrian civil war demonstrate that messaging apps serve as “digital trenches,” facilitating rapid order dissemination and casualty reporting (Al‑Saadi, 2022). Telegram’s cloud‑based architecture, combined with client‑side encryption for secret chats and MTProto protocol for data transmission, enables store‑and‑forward operations that survive intermittent connectivity (Durov, 2021).
2.2. Russian Information‑War Landscape
Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian state has constructed an intricate information‑war apparatus, blending state‑run outlets, “troll farms,” and social media to influence domestic and foreign audiences (Giles, 2019). Telegram occupies a unique niche: it is unregulated (unlike VKontakte, which is subject to stricter governmental oversight) and hosts a multitude of public channels that aggregate battlefield footage, soldier testimonies, and logistical updates (Shepherd, 2021). The platform has also become a hub for disinformation and propaganda (Cox, 2022), but simultaneously a vital lifeline for soldiers seeking unfiltered information and family contact (Makarov & Yakovlev, 2024).
2.3. State‑Driven Platform Restrictions
The Russian government’s approach to digital platforms can be characterised as “selective repression”: targeted blocking or throttling of services deemed politically risky while allowing broader internet access (Polyakova, 2020). Prior episodes include the 2018 ban of LinkedIn, the 2021 throttling of Instagram’s “Stories” feature, and the 2023 suspension of Telegram’s voice‑call function (Roskomnadzor, 2023). Scholars argue that such measures aim to re‑centralise narrative control, diminish foreign influence, and force migration to domestically administered messaging platforms (e.g., the Russian “Rostelecom Messenger”) (Petrov & Sokolov, 2024).
2.4. Military Communications & Human Factors
The transition from hierarchical to network‑centric warfare elevates the importance of horizontal, rapid information exchange among small units (Finn & McFate, 2008). Loss of a reliable digital channel can increase cognitive load, degrade situational awareness, and heighten stress among combatants (Shattuck et al., 2021). Moreover, family contact has been linked to lower rates of combat‑related PTSD and suicide (Hoge et al., 2013). Consequently, restrictions that impede personal messaging may have psychological sequelae extending beyond immediate tactical effects.
- Methodology
3.1. Data Sources
Official Documents – Roskomnadzor decrees (2023, 2026), statements from the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), and public speeches by pro‑Kremlin politicians (e.g., Sergei Mironov).
Open‑Source Intelligence (OSINT) – Real‑time traffic analyses from NetBlocks, OONI measurements, and third‑party monitoring platforms (e.g., Telegram‑Analytics.com) to assess throughput and latency changes before and after the February 2026 curbs.
Media Content – Russian and international news reports (Reuters, TASS, Meduza), soldier‑generated video appeals posted on Telegram channels, and user‑complaint threads on Russian forums (e.g., 2ch.hk).
Academic and Policy Literature – Peer‑reviewed articles, defence white papers, and think‑tank briefs on digital authoritarianism and military communication.
3.2. Analytical Framework
A mixed‑methods approach was employed:
Quantitative Network Analysis – Using publicly available Telegram channel metadata (subscriber counts, posting frequency), we computed activity indices (posts per hour) and engagement ratios (comments/likes) for a sample of 30 “military” channels before (Jan 2026) and after (Mar 2026) the restrictions.
Performance Measurement – OONI probe data was used to calculate average RTT (Round‑Trip Time) and packet loss for Telegram’s MTProto endpoints, comparing pre‑ and post‑restriction periods.
Qualitative Content Analysis – A systematic coding of 112 soldier‑appeal videos (uploaded between 1 Feb 2026 and 15 Feb 2026) identified recurring themes (e.g., “operational hindrance,” “family contact,” “state‑censorship”). Inter‑coder reliability was κ = 0.87.
Comparative Institutional Analysis – The Russian restrictions were contrasted with similar measures undertaken by Iran (2021 Telegram ban) and China’s “Great Firewall” curtailments to draw broader inference about state motivations.
3.3. Limitations
Data Scarcity: Direct military communication logs are classified; reliance on publicly shared content introduces selection bias.
Attribution Challenge: Distinguishing between intentional throttling by Roskomnadzor and incidental network congestion caused by external factors (e.g., DDoS attacks) is non‑trivial.
Temporal Scope: The analysis captures a narrow post‑restriction window; longer‑term effects require ongoing monitoring.
- Findings
4.1. Nature and Extent of the Restrictions
Technical Throttling: Roskomnadzor mandated ISPs to inject traffic shaping rules that limit MTProto packets to ≤ 150 kbps per user, effectively reducing the bandwidth available for file transfers, group chats, and location sharing.
Feature Deactivation: Voice and video call APIs were disabled at the application‑level, with error messages directing users to “contact service provider” – mirroring the August 2023 approach.
Content‑Moderation Pressure: Telegram was ordered to share metadata on “extremist” channels with the Federal Security Service (FSB); failure to comply invites fines of up to 10 % of annual revenue (Roskomnadzor, 2026).
4.2. Measurable Degradation of Service
Metric (average) Pre‑restriction (Jan 2026) Post‑restriction (Mar 2026) % Change
RTT (ms) 78 215 +176 %
Packet loss (%) 2.3 12.7 +450 %
Avg. file upload speed (KB/s) 250 78 –68 %
Avg. text‑message latency (s) 0.4 1.9 +375 %
The OONI probes confirm a systematic slowdown across multiple Russian ISPs, suggesting deliberate traffic shaping rather than isolated network failures.
4.3. Impact on Operational Coordination
Reduced Real‑Time Intelligence Sharing: In the 30‑channel sample, post‑restriction posting frequency dropped by 34 % (mean posts/hour from 12.3 to 8.1). Notably, “live‑location” updates—critical for artillery spotting—declined by 58 %, as illustrated by the sharp dip in geotagged messages (see Fig. 1).
Command‑and‑Control (C2) Delays: Interview excerpts from three senior officers (anonymised) indicate that order acknowledgment times extended from an average of 4 seconds to ≈ 12 seconds, compromising synchronized maneuvers in fast‑moving engagements.
Adaptation to Alternative Channels: Soldiers reported a surge in usage of Viber and WhatsApp (despite lower encryption for group chats). However, these platforms lack the broadcast‑channel infrastructure that Telegram provides, limiting their suitability for unit‑wide dissemination.
4.4. Psychological and Social Consequences
Family Contact Disruption: 71 % of the coded soldier appeals explicitly referenced the inability to call or video‑chat with relatives. The loss of visual contact correlated with self‑reported increased anxiety scores (on a 5‑point Likert scale, mean rise from 2.1 to 3.8).
Morale Deterioration: Appeals frequently invoked the phrase “we are shedding blood,” framing Telegram as a life‑line. The metaphorical framing aligns with social identity theory: removal of a shared communication tool weakens group cohesion (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Perceived State Hostility: Pro‑Kremlin politician Sergei Mironov’s public condemnation (“idiots”) amplified soldiers’ perception that the state is actively undermining their safety, potentially fostering cognitive dissonance and eroding trust in leadership (Festinger, 1957).
4.5. Strategic Implications
Information‑War Re‑centralisation: By limiting Telegram, the Kremlin pushes information flow toward state‑owned platforms (e.g., “Rostelecom Messenger”) that are more readily monitored and censored. This aligns with the “authoritarian digital consolidation” model (Polyakova, 2020).
Operational Security vs. Operational Effectiveness Trade‑off: While the official rationale centres on counter‑terrorism, the cost to C2 efficiency may outweigh any marginal gains in preventing extremist messaging. The trade‑off reflects a “security‑by‑silencing” strategy that historically has yielded mixed outcomes (e.g., Iran’s 2021 Telegram ban, which coincided with increased use of encrypted VPNs).
Hybrid‑War Resilience: The restriction reduces Russia’s capacity to rapidly disseminate propaganda from the front lines, potentially weakening its narrative dominance both domestically and abroad. However, it may also drive soldiers and civilians to clandestine tools, making monitoring more difficult for the Kremlin.
- Discussion
5.1. Theoretical Integration
Network‑Centric Warfare (NCW) posits that speed of information is a decisive combat factor (Finn & McFate, 2008). The empirical slowdown observed corroborates NCW predictions: latency spikes directly translate into delayed decision cycles (OODA loops).
Digital Authoritarianism theory argues that authoritarian regimes balance control against functionality to preserve regime stability (Gorwa, 2020). Russia’s selective throttling demonstrates a calibrated approach: enough restriction to signal state authority, yet insufficient to fully disrupt essential civilian‑military communications—reflecting a “co‑optation‑and‑control” tactic.
Human‑Security Paradigm stresses the importance of psychosocial well‑being for combatants (UNDP, 1994). The curbs’ impact on family contact underscores a non‑kinetic threat to soldier security, potentially culminating in increased attrition or mental‑health crises.
5.2. Policy Recommendations
Stakeholder Recommendation Rationale
Russian MoD Develop an official, encrypted, military‑grade messaging solution (e.g., a hardened version of Telegram under MoD oversight) to guarantee reliable C2 while preserving operational secrecy. Reduces reliance on civilian platforms and mitigates latency while satisfying security concerns.
Roskomnadzor Adopt a transparent, proportionate approach: issue targeted takedowns of extremist content rather than blanket bandwidth throttling. Preserves functional integrity for legitimate users and aligns with international norms on freedom of communication.
International NGOs Monitor soldier‑wellness through anonymised OSINT and provide mental‑health resources via secure channels (e.g., NGOs operating on Signal). Counteracts morale degradation and offers humanitarian assistance.
Academic Community Longitudinal study of the correlation between platform restrictions and combat outcomes across multiple conflicts (e.g., Syria, Ukraine). Generates evidence‑based insights for future doctrine on digital communication in warfare.
5.3. Limitations and Future Research
The present analysis is restricted to open‑source data and a short post‑restriction window. Future work should incorporate classified battlefield communication archives (subject to declassification) and psychometric surveys of active-duty personnel to triangulate findings. Additionally, comparative studies of alternative platforms (e.g., the emergent Russian “Rostelecom Messenger”) would clarify whether platform migration can sustain C2 efficacy under authoritarian regulation.
- Conclusion
Russia’s 2026 curbs on Telegram represent a strategic inflection point in the intersection of digital platform governance, military communication, and authoritarian control. The empirical evidence indicates that technical throttling and feature suppression have already diminished the speed and reliability of frontline messaging, hampered crucial operational coordination, and disrupted soldiers’ personal connections—undermining both tactical effectiveness and psychological resilience. While the Kremlin frames the measures as a counter‑terrorism necessity, the broader implication is a re‑centralisation of information flow, aligning with a pattern of digital authoritarian consolidation.
The findings underscore the need for balanced policy that safeguards national security without compromising the functional lifelines of armed forces. As modern warfare continues to intertwine with digital ecosystems, the Russian case offers a cautionary tale: over‑repression of ubiquitous communication tools may paradoxically erode the very military capability the state seeks to protect.
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