Iran’s Detention of the Foremans: What It Means for Singapore and the World
In-Depth Analysis | International Affairs & Singapore Outlook
When Craig and Lindsay Foreman set off from the United Kingdom on a global motorcycle journey, they embodied the spirit of adventurous travel that has become increasingly common in an interconnected world. Their arrest in Iran on 3 January 2025 — and the subsequent 10-year prison sentence handed down in February 2026 — represents not merely a bilateral dispute between London and Tehran, but a case study with far-reaching implications for every internationally mobile citizen, including the tens of thousands of Singaporeans who travel, work, and reside across the globe each year.
The Foremans’ case has attracted condemnation from British Foreign Minister Yvette Cooper, who described the sentencing as “totally unjustifiable,” and shines a spotlight once more on a practice human rights organisations have long described as state-sponsored hostage-taking. For Singapore — a small, open city-state whose prosperity is inseparable from global connectivity — understanding this phenomenon is not merely an academic exercise. It is a matter of national interest.
The Anatomy of Hostage Diplomacy
The term ‘hostage diplomacy’ or ‘diplomatic hostage-taking’ describes a pattern in which state actors detain foreign nationals — often tourists, dual citizens, or business travellers — and leverage their imprisonment to extract political or economic concessions from other governments. While the practice is ancient in origin, its modern iteration has become increasingly systematic and strategically calibrated.
Iran has been among the most prominent practitioners of this approach in recent decades. Its Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has arrested dozens of foreign and dual nationals, consistently framing detentions around charges of espionage or national security threats. The pattern is remarkably consistent: arrest during a period of heightened geopolitical tension, prolonged pre-trial detention, limited legal access, trials conducted without meaningful defence, and sentences disproportionate to any alleged offence.
The Foremans’ experience follows this template precisely. Arrested while transiting Iran on a motorcycle journey — an activity that is, by definition, visible and non-clandestine — they faced a three-hour trial on 27 October 2025 in which they were reportedly denied the opportunity to present a defence. Their family described periods of solitary confinement, disrupted consular visits, and delayed access to legal representation. Lindsay Foreman is held in the notorious Evin Prison’s women’s section; her husband in its political wing — a facility that has housed some of Iran’s most high-profile political prisoners and that carries its own symbolic weight.
“Human rights organisations say such arrests serve as leverage in disputes with other countries — a pattern of politically motivated detentions that Tehran consistently denies.”
Scholars of international relations have documented similar patterns across a range of state actors. China has been accused of detaining foreign nationals during trade or political disputes; Russia’s detention of American journalist Evan Gershkovich and basketball player Brittney Griner followed comparable logic. North Korea has used detained Americans as bargaining chips with Washington for decades. What makes Iran’s case particularly notable is the scale and regularity with which it has employed this strategy, and the extent to which it has become institutionalised within the IRGC’s operational repertoire.
Legal Frameworks and Their Limits
Under international law, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) establishes clear obligations for states hosting foreign nationals: they must be informed of their right to consular access, and consular officers must be permitted to communicate with and visit detained nationals. Iran is a signatory to the Convention. The Foremans’ case, in which consular visits were reportedly disrupted or cancelled, represents a potential violation of these obligations — one that the British government has the legal standing to raise in international forums.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Iran is also a party, provides further protections under Article 14, guaranteeing the right to a fair trial, including the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, and the right to communicate with counsel. A three-hour trial in which defendants cannot present a defence is, on its face, inconsistent with these obligations.
However, the practical enforceability of these provisions remains limited. International human rights law operates largely on the basis of state consent and reputational pressure. When a state has already demonstrated its willingness to disregard international norms, the incremental deterrent effect of legal condemnation is minimal. The Foremans’ case illustrates what many legal scholars have described as the ‘enforcement gap’ in international human rights law: the gulf between normative aspiration and practical reality.
KEY CASE FACTS: Craig and Lindsay Foreman
Arrested: 3 January 2025 | Location: Iran, during a global motorcycle journey
Charges: Espionage
Trial: 27 October 2025 — 3 hours, no defence permitted
Sentence: 10 years imprisonment (announced February 2026)
Detention: Lindsay at Evin Prison (women’s section); Craig at Evin Prison (political wing)
Conditions: Periods of solitary confinement, limited legal access, disrupted consular visits
Singapore’s Exposure: Why This Case Matters
Singapore occupies a distinctive position in global affairs. As a small, open economy that depends fundamentally on trade, investment, and the free movement of people, it has an acute interest in the stability of international norms governing the treatment of foreign nationals. Singaporeans are among the world’s most internationally mobile populations: the city-state’s residents travel extensively for business and leisure, and a significant diaspora lives and works abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) regularly issues travel advisories and consular guidance precisely because the welfare of Singaporeans overseas is a core state concern.
Singapore’s government maintains diplomatic relations with Iran, and there is a modest but non-trivial bilateral relationship. More broadly, however, the Foremans’ case raises several categories of concern that are directly relevant to Singapore’s interests and its citizens.
- Risk to Singaporean Travellers in High-Risk Jurisdictions
Singapore’s MFA currently advises citizens to exercise caution when travelling to Iran and to register their travel with the MFA’s Overseas Singaporean Portal. However, travel advisories are often perceived as bureaucratic formalities rather than substantive risk assessments. The Foremans’ case — two experienced, law-abiding travellers arrested on what appears to be politically motivated pretexts — should prompt a recalibration of how Singaporeans assess risk in certain jurisdictions.
Countries that have engaged in documented patterns of hostage diplomacy include not only Iran but also China, Russia, and North Korea — destinations or transit points that many Singaporeans visit for business or family reasons. The dual-citizen dimension is particularly relevant: Singaporeans who hold multiple citizenships, or who have significant business or family ties to countries in dispute with the states they are visiting, face elevated risk profiles that standard travel advisories do not always adequately communicate. - Implications for Singapore’s Diplomatic Posture
Singapore has long pursued a foreign policy anchored in the principles of international law, multilateralism, and the sovereign equality of states. It has consistently advocated for rules-based international order, not merely as an idealistic aspiration but as a practical necessity for a small state whose security and prosperity depend on stable, predictable global norms. The erosion of those norms — of which hostage diplomacy is a particularly egregious example — directly threatens Singapore’s strategic environment.
At the same time, Singapore’s foreign policy is characterised by pragmatism and a studied avoidance of becoming embroiled in bilateral disputes between larger powers. The city-state has cultivated relationships with both Western democracies and authoritarian states, including Iran, and has historically been reluctant to issue strong public condemnations of specific human rights cases involving third countries. This posture preserves diplomatic flexibility but carries reputational and normative costs.
The question for Singapore’s policymakers is whether the current balance remains appropriate given the accelerating pace at which hostage diplomacy is being normalised. If major powers are increasingly willing to use foreign nationals as geopolitical instruments, a purely bilateral approach to consular protection — responding case by case when a Singaporean is detained — may be insufficient. A more proactive multilateral approach, potentially through ASEAN or the United Nations Human Rights Council, may be warranted.
“For Singapore — whose prosperity is inseparable from global connectivity — the normalisation of hostage diplomacy is not merely a humanitarian concern. It is a strategic threat.”
- Consular Capacity and Crisis Response
The Foremans’ experience of disrupted consular visits and delayed access to legal representation raises questions about the limits of consular protection even when governments are actively engaged. The UK, a major power with a well-resourced Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), has been unable to secure the Foremans’ release after more than 13 months. Singapore’s consular network, while professional and competent, operates with fewer resources and less geopolitical leverage than its British counterpart.
Singapore has developed robust mechanisms for consular assistance, including the 24-hour MFA Emergency Consular Assistance hotline and regular updates through the Overseas Singaporean Portal. However, the Foremans’ case illustrates that consular assistance — however well-intentioned — has inherent limits when the detaining state is operating in bad faith and using detention as a deliberate instrument of statecraft. Singapore should study this case carefully as it assesses the adequacy of its own consular preparedness. - The Business and Investment Dimension
Singapore is a significant trading hub and a major centre for financial and professional services with connections across the Middle East, including Iran (subject to applicable sanctions regimes). Singaporean businesses and professionals operating in or with connections to jurisdictions that practise hostage diplomacy face genuine legal and personal risks that are not always adequately reflected in corporate risk assessments.
The Foremans were tourists, not businesspeople — which underscores the indiscriminate nature of the risk. Corporate travellers may believe that their professional status, institutional backing, or carefully managed legal compliance provides them with some protection. The historical record suggests otherwise. Several Western business executives have been detained in China and other jurisdictions, often in circumstances that bore little relationship to any legitimate legal concern. Singapore’s business community, and the professional services firms and financial institutions that advise them, should factor this risk more explicitly into their operational frameworks.
The Broader Geopolitical Context
The Foremans’ case does not exist in a vacuum. It occurs against a backdrop of significant geopolitical turbulence: ongoing tensions between Iran and Western governments over the nuclear programme and regional security; a broader fraying of the international liberal order as great-power competition intensifies; and a global trend toward the weaponisation of citizenship and mobility as instruments of statecraft.
Iran’s use of detention as leverage is well-documented. The country has been involved in numerous hostage exchanges in recent years, most notably the 2023 deal that saw the United States release frozen Iranian assets in exchange for American detainees. These exchanges, while producing humanitarian outcomes, create perverse incentives: they confirm that hostage diplomacy works, at least in terms of extracting concessions, and thereby encourage its continued use.
For Singapore, which has invested heavily in the credibility of international institutions and the sanctity of international law, this dynamic is deeply concerning. A world in which states routinely instrumentalise the detention of foreign nationals is one in which the foundations of the international order that Singapore depends upon are being systematically eroded. Singapore’s founding generation of leaders understood, with unusual clarity, that small states are the first to suffer when great powers abandon rules in favour of raw power. That insight remains as relevant today as it was in 1965.
WHAT SINGAPORE CAN DO: Policy Considerations
- Strengthen travel risk communications — Move beyond boilerplate advisories toward substantive, country-specific risk profiles for jurisdictions with documented hostage diplomacy patterns.
- Multilateral advocacy — Work through ASEAN and the UN to develop stronger norms and accountability mechanisms for states that detain foreign nationals for political leverage.
- Consular preparedness — Review and strengthen protocols for cases where a detaining state is operating in bad faith, including pre-positioning of legal resources and inter-governmental coordination mechanisms.
- Corporate guidance — Issue specific guidance to Singaporean businesses and professional travellers operating in high-risk jurisdictions, including due diligence frameworks for assessing personal legal risk.
- Public awareness — Invest in public education to ensure Singaporean travellers understand the real risks in certain jurisdictions and take advantage of existing MFA registration and consular tools.
A Human Story at the Centre
It is important, amid the strategic and legal analysis, not to lose sight of the human reality at the centre of this case. Craig and Lindsay Foreman are a couple who set out to see the world. They are now separated, held in different wings of one of the world’s most notorious prisons, having endured more than 13 months of incarceration for no credible reason. Their family — including Lindsay’s son Joe Bennett, who has become the public face of their campaign — is living through a prolonged nightmare of uncertainty, limited communication, and institutional frustration.
Their story resonates beyond the specifics of Iran-UK relations precisely because it could, in principle, happen to any internationally mobile person. The Foremans were not naive about risk — they were experienced travellers undertaking a planned journey. They were not engaged in anything that could reasonably be construed as espionage. They were simply in the wrong country at the wrong moment of geopolitical tension.
For Singaporeans, accustomed to thinking of travel as a largely benign activity enabled by the city-state’s powerful passport and carefully managed diplomatic relationships, this is a sobering reminder that not all risks are visible on the surface. The calculus of personal safety in international travel has become more complex, and the assumptions that have underpinned it for the past generation deserve critical re-examination.
Conclusion: Rules, Risks, and Resilience
The sentencing of Craig and Lindsay Foreman to 10 years in an Iranian prison is, at one level, a specific bilateral issue between London and Tehran. At another level, it is a window into a world in which the protections that internationally mobile citizens have long taken for granted are eroding. For Singapore — a city-state whose very existence depends on the maintenance of a rules-based international order — this erosion is not a distant concern. It is a present and growing challenge.
The appropriate response is neither panic nor complacency. It is the kind of clear-eyed, systematic engagement that Singapore has historically brought to bear on complex strategic challenges: investing in consular preparedness, strengthening multilateral norms, providing better information to citizens and businesses, and making clear through word and action that the weaponisation of foreign nationals is unacceptable in a civilised international order.
Craig and Lindsay Foreman remain in Evin Prison as these words are written. Their fate is in the hands of the Iranian government and the diplomatic efforts of the UK and its allies. But their case should prompt every government — including Singapore’s — to ask whether it is doing enough to protect its citizens in an increasingly dangerous world, and to adapt its policies accordingly.