CASE STUDY
Geopolitical Implications and Strategic Impact on Singapore’s Quantum Ecosystem
February 2026 | Strategic Technology Analysis

Executive Summary
In early 2026, Rigetti Computing announced an US$8.4 million purchase order from India’s Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (CDAC) for the delivery of a 108-qubit on-premises quantum computer in Bengaluru. This transaction sits within India’s National Quantum Mission (NQM), which has allocated ₹6,000 crore (~US$720 million) for quantum R&D through 2031. While the deal is primarily significant as a commercial proof-point for Rigetti, its broader implications reach far beyond US equity markets — most notably into Southeast Asia and, specifically, Singapore’s own quantum ambitions.
This case study examines: (1) the structural significance of the Rigetti–CDAC contract within the Asian quantum procurement landscape; (2) how India’s quantum acceleration creates competitive and cooperative pressure on Singapore; and (3) the strategic responses available to Singapore as it enters a critical juncture in its National Quantum Strategy (NQS) and the new S$37 billion Research, Innovation and Enterprise (RIE) 2030 plan.

  1. The Rigetti–CDAC Contract: What It Actually Is
    1.1 Contract Parameters
    Parameter Detail
    Contracting Authority Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (CDAC), Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), Government of India
    Vendor Rigetti Computing, Inc. (NASDAQ: RGTI)
    Contract Value US$8.4 million
    System 108-qubit quantum computer (Cepheus-1-108Q, chiplet-based superconducting architecture)
    Deployment Mode On-premises installation, CDAC facility, Bengaluru
    Target Go-Live Second half of 2026
    Strategic Framework India’s National Quantum Mission (NQM); CDAC Hybrid HPC-Quantum Mission
    Broader Relationship MOU signed September 2025 for co-development of cryogenic electronics, processor fabrication, and hybrid HPC-quantum systems

1.2 Why This Deal Matters Beyond Rigetti’s P&L
On its face, an $8.4 million contract for a company burning cash at Rigetti’s rate is more of a narrative event than a financial one. But the deal’s significance is structural rather than accounting-based. Three factors elevate it analytically:
First, it is an on-premises deployment by a sovereign government institution — not a cloud research credit or a paper MOU. This validates that a nation-state has cleared the procurement, security, and infrastructure hurdles required to physically host a superconducting quantum system from a foreign vendor. That precedent matters to any government evaluating similar acquisitions.
Second, the underlying MOU extends the relationship into co-development of indigenous cryogenic electronics under CDAC’s ChipIN programme. This is not a passive customer relationship — India is using Rigetti’s hardware as a scaffold for building domestic quantum manufacturing capability, a playbook that other Asian technology agencies are watching closely.
Third, the NQM’s ₹6,000 crore allocation through 2031 means this is one contract in a multi-year, multi-procurement pipeline. The lumpiness of government quantum spending — noted as a key investment risk — cuts both ways: the same structural dynamic that makes individual contracts unreliable also creates recurring tender opportunities for vendors who establish early reference installations.

  1. India’s National Quantum Mission: The Macro Context
    2.1 Scale and Ambition
    India’s National Quantum Mission was formally announced in April 2023 with a ₹6,003.65 crore (~US$720 million) commitment over eight years through 2031, coordinated by the Department of Science and Technology. The mission encompasses four thematic pillars: quantum computing, quantum communication, quantum sensing and metrology, and quantum materials. CDAC serves as the nodal agency for computing infrastructure, making the Rigetti contract a direct expression of NQM’s procurement arm.
    The scale of NQM places India among the top five national quantum programs globally by committed public expenditure, alongside the United States (National Quantum Initiative, >US$3 billion), China (undisclosed but estimated >US$15 billion), the European Union (Quantum Flagship, €1 billion), and the United Kingdom (~£2.5 billion). For Southeast Asia, India’s program is the most proximate major national quantum mobilisation, given geographic and diplomatic proximity.
    2.2 The Hybrid HPC-Quantum Strategy
    CDAC’s specific architecture — integrating quantum accelerators into existing high-performance computing (HPC) infrastructure — is significant for the regional picture. Rather than pursuing standalone quantum installations, India is pursuing a hybrid model that couples quantum processors to classical supercomputers. This reduces the practical barrier to quantum adoption (existing HPC infrastructure is leveraged) and creates a larger addressable pool of use-cases in the near term. Singapore’s National Quantum Computing Hub (NQCH) is pursuing a similar architectural philosophy, creating both alignment and competitive overlap.
    2.3 Indigenous Capability Building as a Strategic Objective
    A distinguishing feature of NQM, visible in the Rigetti–CDAC MOU, is India’s explicit goal of developing indigenous quantum hardware components — particularly cryogenic control electronics and quantum processor units. This positions India not merely as a quantum consumer but as an aspiring quantum manufacturer. The ChipIN initiative, which provides semiconductor design infrastructure to startups and academia, is the vehicle through which this ambition is being operationalised. For Singapore, which is pursuing its own National Quantum Processor Initiative (NQPI) under the NQS, India’s trajectory represents a case study in how a larger economy translates government mandate into industrial capability at speed.
  2. Singapore’s Quantum Position: Strengths and Vulnerabilities
    3.1 Singapore’s Current Quantum Architecture
    Singapore launched its National Quantum Strategy in May 2024, backed by S$300 million under RIE 2025. The strategy operates across four thrusts: research, engineering, talent, and international partnerships. Key institutional nodes include:
    Centre for Quantum Technologies (CQT) at NUS — one of Asia’s earliest and most productive quantum research institutes, established 2007
    National Quantum Computing Hub (NQCH) — the primary operational quantum computing infrastructure for enterprise and research access
    National Quantum Federated Foundry (NQFF) — quantum device design and fabrication capacity
    National Quantum Processor Initiative (NQPI, launched 2024) — domestic processor manufacturing capability development
    National Quantum-Safe Network (NQSN) — quantum communication security infrastructure
    National Quantum Sensor Programme (NQSP, launched August 2024) — sensing applications across navigation, biomedical, and remote sensing

Singapore has invested cumulatively over S$400 million in quantum since 2007, producing approximately 350 quantum researchers and PhD candidates domestically, and spawning roughly 10 quantum startups across communications, simulation, photonics, and sensing. This is a meaningful foundational position — but it must be assessed relative to what India is now mobilising.
3.2 The February 2026 Budget: A Strategic Inflection Point
Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s Budget 2026 speech on 12 February 2026 announced the RIE 2030 plan with a record S$37 billion over five years — a 32% increase over RIE 2025 — maintaining public R&D at approximately 1% of GDP. PM Wong explicitly identified quantum technology as a primary growth area, citing Singapore’s early institutional bets as now beginning to mature commercially.
The flagship hardware commitment accompanying RIE 2030 is the planned installation of Quantinuum’s Helios trapped-ion quantum computer in Singapore, making it the first country outside the United States to host the system. Alongside this, quantum startup Qolab — co-founded by Nobel laureate John Martinis — has established operations in Singapore, explicitly citing the country’s semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging capabilities as strategic pull factors.
These are high-signal developments: they indicate that Singapore is successfully attracting frontier quantum hardware vendors who see the country’s manufacturing infrastructure as a genuine competitive differentiator, not merely diplomatic courtesy.
3.3 Structural Vulnerabilities
Despite these strengths, Singapore faces structural vulnerabilities that the India–Rigetti deal illuminates by contrast. Population and talent depth remain binding constraints: with approximately 350 domestic quantum researchers, Singapore’s talent pool is significantly smaller than India’s, the EU’s, or the US’s. The NQPI’s goal of domestic processor manufacturing is laudable but requires sustained industrial-scale semiconductor expertise that Singapore’s broader semiconductor sector provides only partially.
Singapore’s quantum startups remain in early commercial stages. The SGInnovate-backed ecosystem has produced viable early-stage companies but none at the scale required to win sovereign procurement contracts of the type that CDAC has just placed with Rigetti. This means Singapore remains dependent on international hardware vendors — a position that entails both access advantages (state-of-the-art foreign systems) and strategic risks (supply chain dependency, technology transfer limitations, geopolitical exposure).

  1. Comparative Analysis: India vs. Singapore Quantum Trajectories
    Dimension India (NQM) Singapore (NQS / RIE 2030)
    Committed Public Investment ₹6,003 cr (~US$720M) through 2031 S$37B (RIE 2030, broad); ~S$300M+ quantum-specific
    Program Duration 8 years (2023–2031) 5 years (2026–2030), building on ~17 years since CQT
    Primary Hardware Strategy Foreign procurement (Rigetti) + indigenous co-development (CDAC-ChipIN) Foreign hosting (Quantinuum Helios) + domestic fabrication (NQPI, Qolab partnership)
    Qubit Technology Focus Superconducting (Rigetti partnership) Trapped-ion (Quantinuum), Superconducting (Qolab)
    Indigenous Manufacturing Goal Explicit — cryogenic electronics via ChipIN Explicit — processor design via NQPI; leveraging semiconductor sector
    HPC Integration Core strategy (Hybrid HPC-Quantum Mission, CDAC) Present via NQCH; less centralised
    Talent Depth Large university system; deep STEM pipeline ~350 researchers; smaller but high-quality pipeline
    Regional Role Aspiring quantum exporter within South Asia and Global South Aspiring regional quantum hub for Southeast Asia / ASEAN
    Key Procurement Partner Rigetti Computing (US) Quantinuum (US/UK)
    Civilian Applications Focus Scientific R&D, HPC augmentation, materials, pharma Drug discovery, financial modeling, advanced materials, cybersecurity
  2. Impact Vectors: How the India–Rigetti Deal Affects Singapore
    5.1 Competitive Pressure on Regional Quantum Leadership
    Singapore has positioned itself as the quantum hub for Southeast Asia, operating on the reasonable assumption that most ASEAN nations lack the domestic capacity to build standalone quantum programs. India’s NQM does not directly compete for this ASEAN-hub positioning — India is targeting a different geographic and political constituency. However, India’s rapid capability acceleration raises a subtler competitive pressure: if India becomes a credible provider of quantum computing access and services to the Global South (including parts of Southeast Asia and South Asia), it could displace Singapore’s aspiration to serve as the region’s quantum-computing-as-a-service gateway.
    RSIS analyst commentary has already flagged that Singapore may benefit as a cloud quantum access hub given the established presence of AWS and similar cloud providers. If India builds its own cloud quantum offering atop the CDAC infrastructure — which is entirely plausible given CDAC’s mandate — Singapore’s competitive moat in regional quantum access narrows.
    5.2 Technology Partner Diversification Signal
    The Rigetti–CDAC deal and Singapore’s Quantinuum partnership represent two distinct technology bets: superconducting qubits (Rigetti) versus trapped-ion qubits (Quantinuum). These are not merely product choices — they represent fundamental architectural commitments with different fidelity profiles, operating temperatures, gate speeds, and scalability trajectories. Rigetti’s chiplet-based superconducting approach targets speed and scalability; Quantinuum’s trapped-ion Helios system leads on gate fidelity, which is critical for near-term error-corrected applications.
    Singapore’s emerging relationship with Qolab — working on superconducting qubit components — means Singapore is, in effect, hedging across both modalities. This is strategically sound but resource-intensive. The question is whether Singapore’s talent pipeline can sustain deep expertise across multiple qubit technologies simultaneously, or whether focus would yield higher returns.
    5.3 Procurement Template and Policy Learning
    The CDAC procurement process — from MOU signing (September 2025) to confirmed purchase order (early 2026) — demonstrates a government-to-industry procurement pathway that Singapore’s NQO and A*STAR could study and adapt. The hybrid model (first sign an MOU to de-risk co-development relationships, then convert to a purchase order with defined delivery milestones) reduces procurement uncertainty for both buyer and vendor. Singapore’s NQCH has pursued a similar partnership model with Quantinuum, but the India case offers data points on timeline, value, and scope of co-development obligations that can inform future NQCH hardware tenders.
    5.4 Talent and Workforce Development Spillovers
    One of the explicit components of the CDAC–Rigetti collaboration is workforce development: training Indian researchers and engineers to operate, maintain, and programme the 108-qubit system. As quantum talent remains globally scarce, Singapore must monitor whether India’s large-scale training programmes create a quantum workforce that competes with Singapore for international quantum roles — or whether India’s graduates become a talent pool that Singapore can attract, given its established status as a destination for Indian technology professionals.
    The Quantinuum R&D and Operations Centre established in Singapore under the November 2025 partnership serves a directly analogous function to CDAC’s workforce development programme — creating a node of in-country quantum expertise. Singapore’s advantage here is its institutional openness to international talent mobility, which India’s programme cannot easily replicate.
    5.5 Quantum-Safe Cryptography and National Security
    India’s NQM encompasses quantum communication alongside computing. Singapore’s NQSN is similarly active in quantum-safe network trials. As both countries accelerate quantum communications infrastructure, the question of interoperability, standards alignment, and bilateral data security agreements becomes more pressing. Singapore and India have an existing bilateral digital connectivity framework through the India-Singapore Ministerial Roundtable on Digital Connectivity (ISMRDC); this forum could serve as the vehicle for coordinating quantum communication standards that benefit both nations and the broader ASEAN-South Asia corridor.
  3. Strategic Recommendations for Singapore
    6.1 Deepen ASEAN Quantum Leadership Before India Fills the Vacuum
    Singapore should accelerate its quantum-computing-as-a-service offerings to ASEAN members, leveraging the Quantinuum Helios installation and NQCH cloud access as differentiators. The window before India’s NQM infrastructure becomes regionally accessible is approximately 2026–2029. Singapore’s NQO should engage ASEAN counterparts through existing frameworks (ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025, ASEAN Smart Cities Network) to embed Singapore-operated quantum access as the de facto regional infrastructure.
    6.2 Formalise a Singapore–India Quantum Cooperation Track
    Rather than treating India’s NQM as a competitive threat, Singapore’s NQO should pursue a bilateral quantum cooperation agreement with India’s Department of Science and Technology. Potential areas for cooperation include joint use-case development in pharmaceutical discovery and financial risk modelling (sectors of mutual economic importance), coordinated quantum-safe network standards, and talent exchange programmes between CQT/NQCH and CDAC. Singapore has successfully used bilateral MOUs in semiconductor and biomedical sectors to convert potential competition into supply-chain partnerships — this model should be applied to quantum.
    6.3 Diversify Hardware Vendor Strategy
    Singapore’s current primary hardware commitment is to Quantinuum’s trapped-ion platform. The NQPI and Qolab partnership provide superconducting exposure, but Singapore should evaluate whether a direct engagement with a superconducting system vendor — potentially including Rigetti, IonQ, or domestic development through NQPI — is warranted for the NQCH portfolio. Hardware monoculture creates both technical and geopolitical risks: if Quantinuum’s IPO (filed confidentially in January 2026) leads to strategic shifts in the company’s international partnerships, Singapore’s primary quantum computing access could be disrupted.
    6.4 Use RIE 2030 to Fund a Quantum Talent Surge
    Singapore’s ~350 quantum researchers represents a structural constraint on ambition. The RIE 2030 allocation should include a dedicated quantum talent programme targeting: (a) international PhD recruitment with a pathway to Singapore residency; (b) quantum engineering conversion programmes for Singapore’s existing semiconductor workforce; and (c) a quantum industry fellowship scheme linking NUS/NTU/SUTD researchers with commercial partners in the NQCH ecosystem. India’s workforce development through CDAC partnerships offers a scalable template; Singapore’s comparative advantage is the quality and international profile of the positions it can offer.
    6.5 Establish a Quantum Procurement Framework
    Singapore currently lacks a standardised procurement framework for quantum computing systems, meaning each NQCH hardware acquisition involves bespoke negotiation. The CDAC–Rigetti transaction, with its MOU-to-PO pipeline, illustrates how a structured procurement template reduces transaction costs and enables faster capability build-out. Singapore’s GovTech and NQO should jointly develop a Quantum Hardware Procurement Framework that specifies technical evaluation criteria, co-development obligations, workforce training requirements, and data sovereignty provisions. This framework would also signal to international vendors — and to ASEAN partners considering Singapore as a model — that Singapore is a mature, predictable quantum procurement market.
  4. Conclusion
    The Rigetti–CDAC deal is a $8.4 million transaction in a niche technology sector. Its analytical weight is disproportionate to its dollar value because it is a signal: of India’s seriousness in executing its National Quantum Mission, of the commercial viability of on-premises superconducting quantum systems, and of the emerging geography of sovereign quantum procurement in Asia.
    For Singapore, the signal is primarily motivating rather than threatening. India’s quantum acceleration does not displace Singapore’s strengths — its institutional depth at CQT, its semiconductor manufacturing base, its status as a trusted neutral hub for international technology partnerships, and its new commitments under RIE 2030. But it does compress the timeline within which Singapore must convert those strengths into operational regional quantum leadership. The window is open; the RIE 2030 resources are committed; the international partners (Quantinuum, Qolab) are engaged.
    What is now required is execution velocity — accelerating NQCH access for regional users, deepening bilateral quantum diplomacy with India and other Asian quantum programs, and building the talent pipeline that will sustain Singapore’s quantum ambitions beyond the current hardware acquisition phase. The India–Rigetti case study is a useful reminder that in quantum computing, as in most strategic technologies, the nations that win are those that translate policy commitments into operational infrastructure before the window closes.
    Research Sources & Data Provenance
    This case study draws on publicly available information including: Rigetti Computing SEC filings and press releases (2025–2026); CDAC official statements and MeitY programme documentation; Singapore’s National Quantum Office publications and NQO.sg; RSIS Policy Briefs on Singapore’s National Quantum Strategy; Singapore Budget 2026 RIE 2030 plan (PM Lawrence Wong, 12 February 2026); Quantum Computing Report analysis; and secondary analysis from Simply Wall St, Zacks, and Nasdaq research. All financial projections cited are third-party analyst estimates and do not constitute investment advice.