US-Israeli Strikes on Iran, Maritime Disruption, and Implications for Singapore
Prepared: 1 March 2026 | Classification: Unclassified | Status: Rapidly Evolving
1. Executive Summary
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated military strikes against Iran, targeting hundreds of sites including reports of explosions near Kharg Island — Iran’s primary crude export terminal — and Dezful. Within hours, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) began broadcasting naval warnings on VHF radio instructing all vessels to halt transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian media described the waterway as ‘practically closed.’ Vessel tracking data confirmed a 70 per cent drop in shipping traffic by late evening on 28 February. By 1 March 2026, major carriers including Hapag-Lloyd had suspended all Hormuz transits indefinitely, Maersk and CMA CGM had shelved planned returns to the Red Sea, and Houthi forces had resumed attacks on Red Sea shipping in solidarity with Iran.
The Strait of Hormuz is functionally irreplaceable in the global energy architecture. Approximately 13-20 million barrels of crude oil per day and 20-22 per cent of globally traded LNG — primarily Qatari exports — pass through its 33-kilometre narrows. Available bypass pipeline capacity (Saudi East-West Pipeline and UAE Habshan-Fujairah pipeline) totals roughly 6.5-8.5 million bpd, leaving a minimum shortfall of 5-13 million bpd even if fully utilised. The reported death of Supreme Leader Khamenei in the strikes introduces a political leadership vacuum that simultaneously elevates IRGC escalation risk and creates a fragile opening for eventual de-escalation.
| Situation at a Glance — 1 March 2026Brent crude last traded at $72.87/bbl (Friday close). Markets forecast $5-10/bbl spike on open Sunday evening. Analysts at Rapidan Energy warn of $100+/bbl if disruption persists. Hapag-Lloyd, Maersk, CMA CGM have suspended Gulf/Red Sea transits. 550+ vessels (100+ containerships, 450+ tankers, 200+ bulk carriers) remain in or near the strait. 55 oil tankers are inside Iranian waters. War-risk insurance cancellation notices issued; premiums expected to rise 50%. Houthis have resumed Red Sea attacks, creating a dual-chokepoint crisis with no modern precedent. |
2. Strategic Background
2.1 The Strait of Hormuz: Geographic and Strategic Significance
The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. At its narrowest navigable point, the designated traffic separation scheme consists of two two-mile shipping lanes separated by a two-mile buffer zone — both lanes falling within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman under UNCLOS. This geographic reality affords Tehran significant legal and operational leverage over commercial transit independent of US naval presence in the region.
| Metric | Data / Significance |
| Daily crude oil flows | 13-20 million barrels/day (~31% of global seaborne crude flows; ~20% of global daily oil consumption) |
| LNG share | 20-22% of globally traded LNG, primarily Qatar (~9.3 Bcf/day); UAE adds ~0.7 Bcf/day |
| Monthly vessel transits | ~3,000 vessels including VLCCs, LNG tankers, containerships, bulk carriers |
| Annual trade value | ~$500 billion in energy trade (US Energy Information Administration estimate) |
| Primary recipients | China, India, Japan, South Korea — approximately 69% of crude and 52% of LNG flows |
| No viable sea alternative | Cape of Good Hope adds 10-14 transit days; Suez route unavailable due to Houthi threat |
2.2 Escalation Timeline
The crisis did not emerge without warning. The following timeline contextualises the February 2026 strikes within a 12-month escalatory arc:
- June 2025: US and Israel struck Iranian nuclear sites. Iran’s parliament voted to close the Strait of Hormuz; the Supreme National Security Council did not ratify. Oil prices spiked briefly then recovered as the strait remained open.
- Late 2025: Trump administration imposed 25% secondary tariffs on states conducting business with Iran, intensifying economic pressure. Iran accelerated IRGC naval drills.
- February 17, 2026: Iran conducted live-fire IRGC military exercises in the strait, temporarily restricting sections of the inbound shipping lane. Analysts described this as geopolitical messaging, not operational closure.
- February 22-28, 2026: Brent crude rose to a seven-month high as markets priced growing conflict probability. US carrier strike groups, including the USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Abraham Lincoln, massed in the region — described as one of the largest US military build-ups since the 2003 Iraq War.
- February 28, 2026: Coordinated US-Israeli strikes on hundreds of Iranian targets. Supreme Leader Khamenei reported killed. IRGC broadcasts Hormuz transit ban. Iran launches missile strikes on US bases in Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Bahrain. MarineTraffic records 70% traffic drop.
- March 1, 2026 (present): Hapag-Lloyd suspends all Hormuz transits. Maersk and CMA CGM divert to Cape. Houthis resume Red Sea and Gulf of Aden missile and drone attacks on shipping, citing solidarity with Iran.
2.3 The Dual-Chokepoint Problem
A structural feature distinguishing the current crisis from June 2025 is the simultaneous disruption of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb corridor. The Houthis had suspended attacks as part of the Trump-brokered Gaza ceasefire arrangement but resumed operations immediately after the Iranian strikes. This means the two principal maritime corridors connecting the Indian Ocean to global trade lanes — Hormuz for the Persian Gulf, Bab el-Mandeb for the Red Sea and Suez route — are simultaneously compromised. The only remaining viable alternative is the Cape of Good Hope route, adding 10-14 days and significant fuel and insurance cost to every voyage. Xeneta’s Peter Sand stated explicitly that any planned return of container shipping to the Red Sea in 2026 has been ‘shelved until the security situation becomes clearer.’
3. Current Situation Assessment (1 March 2026)
3.1 Maritime Operational Status
The IRGC is broadcasting on VHF radio: ‘No ship is allowed to pass the Strait of Hormuz.’ There has been no formal written closure declaration by the Iranian government, and Iran has not publicly confirmed the instruction. A European Union naval mission official confirmed to Reuters that vessels are receiving these warnings from Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces. In practice, the combination of explicit verbal warnings, GNSS spoofing near Iran, US maritime warning zone declarations, and insurance market collapse constitutes a functional closure regardless of any formal announcement.
- Kpler data: Four VLCCs (Orbiter, Universal Victor, Mitake, Trikwong Venture) have diverted; collectively representing 8 million barrels of crude scheduled for loading March 3-7.
- Vessel count: 100+ containerships, 450+ oil and gas tankers, and 200+ bulk carriers identified inside or near the Strait as of 28 February; 55 oil tankers remain inside Iranian waters.
- GNSS spoofing: At least two Global Navigation Satellite System spoofing incidents detected near Iran by 10:00 UTC; the majority of vessels in the area began U-turns or idling after 15:30 UTC.
- US maritime warning zone: Covers the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, and Strait of Hormuz. The US Navy explicitly states it ‘cannot guarantee the safety of neutral or merchant shipping.’
3.2 Carrier Actions
| Actor | Response |
| Hapag-Lloyd | Suspended all Hormuz transits until further notice; crew, vessel, and cargo safety cited as primary priority |
| Maersk | Diverting ME11 and MECL services around Cape of Good Hope; shelved Red Sea return plans |
| CMA CGM | Suspended planned return of FAL1, FAL3, MEX services to Red Sea; citing ‘complex and uncertain context’ |
| Oil majors / trading houses | Multiple senior trading desks confirmed ships will ‘stay put for several days’ — Reuters |
| Greek shipping ministry | Advised all Greek-flagged vessels to exercise maximum vigilance and avoid the Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Hormuz |
| UKMTO (UK) | Issued caution advisory; warned of elevated electronic interference including AIS disruption |
| US Navy | Established maritime warning zone; no guarantee of safety for merchant vessels issued |
3.3 Insurance Market
War-risk insurers have submitted cancellation notices for existing policies covering Hormuz transits. Brokers report new cover is expected to cost up to 50% more when available at all. This echoes the Red Sea crisis dynamics of 2024, when war-risk premiums for Bab el-Mandeb transits rose approximately tenfold. Oil company analyst Tom Kloza of Kloza Advisors noted: the extent of Iranian strikes on neighbouring Gulf states ‘puts pressure on insurers to either aggressively raise tanker rates for Strait of Hormuz travel or balk at underwriting any traffic.’ In practice, insurance unavailability functions as a de facto closure mechanism even without active Iranian naval interdiction.
3.4 Oil Market Snapshot
| Indicator | Value / Note |
| Brent crude (Fri close) | $72.87/bbl — up 2.87% on the day before strikes began |
| WTI (Fri close) | $67.02/bbl — up 2.78% |
| Projected open (Sun/Mon) | $78-85/bbl (Vanda Insights, Vandana Hari, Singapore); worst-case $100+/bbl if conflict persists |
| Analyst consensus range | $5-10/bbl immediate spike; $100+ if protracted; ‘guaranteed global recession’ if prolonged (Rapidan Energy) |
| Chinese exposure | China receives ~50% of its crude imports through Hormuz (CNBC/Kpler) |
| Spare capacity status | World spare capacity largely resident in Gulf states — also trapped behind Hormuz |
4. Scenario Outlook
The duration and scope of the Hormuz disruption is the single most consequential variable for the global economic outlook. Three scenarios are assessed below, drawing on analysis from Rapidan Energy, Quantum Strategy, ClearView Energy Partners, UBS, Rabobank, and Kpler.
Scenario A — Short, Contained Conflict (1-7 days)
| Factor | Assessment |
| Description | US achieves rapid air/naval dominance. Iran signals de-escalation or is militarily neutralised. IRGC withdraws Hormuz ban within days. US Navy escort operations restore commercial transit. |
| Oil price | Brent spikes to $78-85/bbl initially, retreats to $70-75/bbl within 10 days as supply resumes. Replicates June 2025 recovery pattern. |
| Shipping | Backlog of 550+ waiting vessels clears within 2-3 weeks. War-risk premiums remain elevated 1-2 months. |
| Complicating factor | Leadership vacuum after Khamenei death may delay coherent Iranian de-escalation. IRGC may act autonomously. |
| Probability | Moderate — US military superiority is substantial but Iranian asymmetric capabilities (mines, fast boats, shore missiles, GNSS spoofing) create meaningful execution risk. |
Scenario B — Protracted Conflict (3-5 weeks)
| Factor | Assessment |
| Description | IRGC conducts asymmetric naval operations: mining, fast boat attacks on tankers, shore-based missile harassment. Strait partially operational but high-risk. US attempts broader regime change. |
| Oil price | Brent $95-110/bbl. US taps Strategic Petroleum Reserve (~600 million barrels). IEA coordinates emergency releases. Relief partial and temporary given reserve capacity vs. disrupted volume. |
| Shipping | All major carriers on Cape diversion, adding $1,000-2,000/TEU on Asia-Europe lanes. Jebel Ali, Singapore, and Tanjung Pelepas face schedule disruption. LNG spot prices spike as European buyers compete with Asian buyers for non-Gulf supply. |
| Houthi dimension | Resumed Red Sea attacks eliminate the safety valve; vessels face dual chokepoint risk on both primary routes. |
| Probability | Moderate to high — Iranian mine stocks and shore-based missile capability are substantial. Dual-chokepoint dynamics reduce pressure on Iran to de-escalate. |
Scenario C — Full Prolonged Closure (1-6 months)
| Factor | Assessment |
| Description | Iran deploys naval mines and shore-based missiles to deny strait access. US mine-clearance and escort operations face asymmetric opposition. Gulf spare capacity trapped and unavailable to markets. |
| Oil price | Brent above $120/bbl; $150-200/bbl cited in extreme analyses. Bob McNally (Rapidan Energy, former White House energy advisor): ‘A prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz is a guaranteed global recession.’ |
| LNG | Qatar’s ~9.3 Bcf/day of LNG exports largely trapped; European and Asian gas markets severely disrupted. Florence Schmit (Rabobank): ‘If Qatar… is unable to export… the impact on global gas prices would be dramatic.’ |
| SPR limits | Combined global strategic reserves (~1.5 billion barrels) provide roughly 75 days of coverage at disrupted volumes — insufficient for a months-long closure. |
| Probability | Lower but non-trivial. Iran faces severe economic self-harm. However, Khamenei’s death removes a moderating force; IRGC commanders may pursue maximalist strategy in political vacuum. |
4.1 Bypass Infrastructure: The Hard Constraint
A critical structural limitation on any mitigation response is the inadequacy of bypass pipeline capacity. Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline can carry 5 million barrels per day (expandable to 7 million), currently operating at 10-35% utilisation. The UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah pipeline adds 1.5 million bpd. Combined bypass capacity of approximately 6.5-8.5 million bpd is far below the 13-20 million bpd flowing through Hormuz. Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Iran have no meaningful bypass infrastructure. Qatar’s entire LNG export programme — approximately 9.3 Bcf/day — has no viable bypass, with only the Dolphin pipeline (2.6 Bcf/day to UAE, with no further export routing) offering partial relief.
5. Implications for Singapore
Singapore’s exposure to the Strait of Hormuz crisis is multidimensional, structurally significant, and in several respects distinct from other economies. As a small open economy with no domestic energy resources, one of the world’s pre-eminent transshipment hubs, a major global refining centre, a key LNG importer, and an active financial market, Singapore sits at the intersection of virtually every transmission channel from this crisis. Kenneth Goh, Director of Private Wealth at UOB Kay Hian in Singapore, captured the systemic nature of the risk: ‘Venezuela was a production story. [Iran] is a chokepoint story.’
5.1 Energy Security
Singapore has no domestic oil or gas production. Jurong Island — home to one of the world’s largest integrated petrochemical complexes, processing approximately 1.3 million barrels of oil equivalent per day — is entirely dependent on imported feedstocks. Middle Eastern crudes, particularly Saudi Arabian and UAE grades, constitute a meaningful share of Jurong Island’s refinery slate. A prolonged Hormuz closure would redirect Gulf crude to Cape routing, extending delivery timelines by 10-14 days and increasing per-barrel landed cost.
On natural gas, Singapore imports piped gas from Indonesia and Malaysia, supplemented by LNG imports via Singapore LNG Corporation (SLNG) at Jurong Island. Qatari LNG represents a significant component of Singapore’s LNG import portfolio. Florence Schmit of Rabobank warned that if Qatar ‘is unable to export due to infrastructure damage or shipping disruptions, the impact on global gas prices would be dramatic.’ Singapore’s LNG storage buffers at SLNG provide some short-term protection; sustained Qatari export disruption would test those limits.
- Immediate (1-7 days): Higher crude import costs; potential refinery feedstock tightening for Gulf-origin grades
- Short-term (1-4 weeks): LNG spot price increase affecting Jurong Island petrochemical input costs; bunker fuel supply tightening
- Medium-term (1-3 months): Structural elevation of energy import costs; possible refinery slate optimisation toward non-Gulf crude
- Long-term: Accelerated energy diversification, including renewable and alternative energy investment
5.2 Shipping and Port Operations
Singapore’s Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) operates the world’s second-busiest container port by tonnage and the largest transshipment hub in Asia. The dual-chokepoint crisis creates compounding stress through three channels:
Rerouting and traffic patterns: Carriers diverting from both Hormuz and the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope will bypass the traditional Middle East-Asia routing entirely. On eastbound Cape voyages, Singapore remains a viable waypoint and may absorb additional transshipment from diverted services, partially offsetting volume losses from suspended Gulf-route services.
Port congestion risk: As carriers simultaneously abandon both the Red Sea and Hormuz routes, schedule compression, delayed vessel arrivals, and cascading congestion at Singapore’s Pasir Panjang, Tanjung Pagar, and Tuas terminals is possible. PSA has significant operational buffer capacity but a sustained dual-chokepoint scenario of 4+ weeks would test yard utilisation.
Bunkering revenue: Singapore is the world’s largest bunkering port by volume. Vessels rerouted to Cape may call Singapore more frequently as an Indian Ocean waypoint, offering partial offset. However, reduced overall Gulf-route calling frequency suppresses aggregate bunkering demand. Bunker fuel supply tightening from Gulf refinery disruption adds a cost-side pressure.
5.3 Financial Markets
When Asian equity and commodity markets open on Monday 2 March 2026, Singapore will face the following dynamics:
| Market Segment | Singapore-Specific Impact |
| Straits Times Index (STI) | Expected to open lower; shipping, aviation, energy-intensive sectors most exposed. Sembcorp Marine, Wilmar International, Singapore Airlines particularly sensitive. |
| SGD/USD | Modest risk-off pressure expected; MAS managed float regime provides buffer. SGD’s relative safe-haven characteristics within ASEAN may limit depreciation. |
| Gold and USD | Flight-to-safety flows likely to strengthen both; Singapore’s gold storage and commodity trading infrastructure may see increased activity. |
| Logistics REITs | Mapletree Logistics Trust and others with Gulf asset exposure face occupancy and valuation uncertainty. |
| SGX derivatives | Oil futures, commodity derivatives, and shipping freight derivatives will see heightened volatility and volume. |
| Insurance sector | Singapore-listed and -registered marine insurers face claims uncertainty; war-risk premium revision will affect premium income. |
5.4 Petrochemical and Manufacturing
Jurong Island’s integrated petrochemical complex processes approximately 1.3 million barrels of oil per day, with operators including ExxonMobil Chemical, Shell Chemicals, Sumitomo Chemical, and Mitsui Chemicals. Feedstock costs — naphtha, condensate, ethane — are directly linked to crude oil and LNG prices. A sustained $10/bbl increase in Brent translates to meaningfully higher variable operating costs across the complex. The downstream effect compresses margins on petrochemical products (polyethylene, polypropylene, aromatics) used in packaging, electronics, textiles, and consumer goods manufacturing. Singapore’s petrochemical sector, navigating post-pandemic overcapacity across Asia-Pacific, faces an additional headwind at a structurally difficult juncture.
5.5 Consumer Price Inflation
Singapore’s near-total import dependence means energy price shocks and supply chain disruptions transmit rapidly into consumer prices. Multiple pathways operate simultaneously:
- Food: Fertiliser and grain shipments transiting Hormuz will face delays or additional cost from rerouting. Food price inflation expected to tick upward in Singapore within 4-8 weeks.
- Consumer electronics and manufactured goods: Just-in-time supply chains serving Singapore’s retail and electronics sectors face extended lead times and elevated logistics costs. Component availability uncertainty may cause inventory hoarding.
- Fuel and transport: Pump prices and public transport fuel costs will reflect higher oil prices; the government has tools (fuel duty rebates, public transport fare adjustment framework) to moderate passthrough.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is likely to maintain or tighten the managed SGD exchange rate appreciation slope — its primary monetary policy instrument — to counteract imported inflation, as it has done effectively in past commodity price shocks (notably 2021-2023).
5.6 Diplomatic and Foreign Policy Positioning
Singapore’s foreign policy model rests on credibility as a rules-based-order-aligned small state with balanced commercial and security relationships across the major powers. The Hormuz crisis creates a complex diplomatic environment:
- Singapore maintains robust commercial ties with Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar, whose exports are directly disrupted and whose nationals and assets are under threat from Iranian missile strikes.
- Singapore hosts US naval logistics facilities (Changi Naval Base) and has deep security cooperation with Washington, creating implicit alignment pressure.
- China is Singapore’s largest trading partner and the world’s largest importer of Hormuz-transiting crude. Any Sino-American escalation dimension — for instance, if China challenges US maritime operations to protect energy flows — would acutely complicate Singapore’s balancing position.
- Singapore has historically advocated strongly for UNCLOS and freedom of navigation. MFA statements will likely call for de-escalation and reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international maritime law.
6. Key Indicators to Monitor
| Indicator | Monitoring Threshold / Significance |
| Brent crude price | $85/bbl threshold (elevated risk); $100/bbl threshold (severe disruption scenario confirmed) |
| Vessel traffic data | Kpler/MarineTraffic Hormuz transit rates; VLCC U-turn frequency; AIS dropout rates near Iran |
| Insurance market | War-risk premium levels and policy availability for Gulf transits — effective barometer of de facto closure |
| IRGC naval activity | Mine deployment reports; fast boat interdictions; shore missile firings at commercial vessels |
| US military operations | Mine-clearance operations; naval escort programme announcements; carrier group repositioning |
| Iranian political succession | Post-Khamenei leadership; whether IRGC or civilian factions gain control; ceasefire signalling |
| Saudi pipeline utilisation | East-West Pipeline throughput increase indicates Gulf bypass attempt underway |
| Qatar LNG loading | QatarEnergy/Rasgas loading terminal data; any Cape diversion of LNG tankers |
| IEA/SPR coordination | Coordinated strategic reserve releases signal that governments are treating disruption as severe and sustained |
| Houthi attack frequency | Red Sea remains a compounding chokepoint; escalation or de-escalation here affects overall scenario severity |
| STI and SGD movements | Singapore-specific financial stress barometers; monitor on Monday open |
| China diplomatic response | PLAN naval posture near Hormuz; any mediation initiative; China-Iran crisis communication |
7. Conclusion
The Strait of Hormuz crisis of February-March 2026 represents the most serious test of global energy security architecture since the 1973 oil embargo — and in absolute supply volume terms, a potential disruption of far greater magnitude. The 1973 embargo removed approximately 7% of global supply and triggered a 300% price increase; a complete Hormuz closure removes up to 20% of daily global oil demand and 22% of LNG trade through a single chokepoint with no viable short-term seaborne alternative.
Several features make this crisis structurally more dangerous than its predecessors. The death of Supreme Leader Khamenei removes both a pragmatic moderating influence and a coherent decision-making authority from Iran, creating a window in which IRGC commanders could pursue escalatory actions without effective civilian oversight. The simultaneous resumption of Houthi attacks eliminates the Red Sea escape valve. The global oil market, while currently carrying a modest oversupply buffer, has spare capacity concentrated overwhelmingly in the same Gulf states whose exports are now trapped behind the disruption.
For Singapore, the crisis is not a distant geopolitical event but a direct structural challenge to the energy, shipping, and commercial foundations of its economy. The government’s macroeconomic toolkit — MAS exchange rate management, EMA strategic reserves, Temasek and GIC investment buffers, fiscal stabilisation capacity — provides meaningful resilience for a short and contained scenario. A protracted Scenario B or C outcome would test the limits of those instruments and require more fundamental responses: emergency energy procurement diversification, port operational contingency planning, and coordinated regional diplomatic engagement.
The situation remains rapidly evolving. This assessment should be updated as vessel traffic data, oil price movements at Sunday evening market open, and military operational developments become available. The next 48-72 hours are likely to be decisive in determining whether this crisis follows the June 2025 recovery pattern or breaks into genuinely uncharted economic territory.
Sources and References
Compiled from the following sources, accessed 28 February – 1 March 2026:
- Bloomberg: ‘Oil Tankers Avoiding Vital Hormuz Strait After US Bombs Iran’ (28 Feb 2026); ‘Can Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz?’ (28 Feb 2026); ‘US, Israel Launch Attacks on Iran’ (28 Feb 2026)
- CNBC: ‘How the attack on Iran could impact the global oil market’ (28 Feb 2026); ‘Markets brace for impact following US military strikes against Iran’ (28 Feb 2026)
- gCaptain: ‘Tankers Diverting Strait of Hormuz Region as US/Israel Strikes on Iran Intensify’ (28 Feb 2026)
- The National (UAE): ‘Iranian Navy tells ships to avoid Strait of Hormuz’ (28 Feb 2026); ‘US-Iran war: What will the impact be on oil?’ (28 Feb 2026)
- Container News: ‘Iran closes Strait of Hormuz: Carriers abandon the region’ (28 Feb 2026)
- Fox Business / Reuters: ‘Oil markets on edge as Iran moves to restrict vital Strait of Hormuz’ (1 Mar 2026)
- Al Jazeera: ‘Iran-US tensions: What would blocking Strait of Hormuz mean for oil, LNG?’ (22 Feb 2026)
- NPR: ‘How could the US strikes in Iran affect global oil supply?’ (28 Feb 2026)
- The Straits Times: ‘Shipping traffic through Strait of Hormuz plummets after attacks on Iran’ (1 Mar 2026)
- Congressional Research Service: ‘Iran Conflict and the Strait of Hormuz: Oil and Gas Market Impacts’ (2026)
- Control Risks: ‘The Strait of Hormuz: how would a closure impact trade?’
- Modern Diplomacy: ‘The economic cost of closure of the Strait of Hormuz for the world’ (July 2025)
- Kpler, Xeneta, MarineTraffic: Vessel tracking and freight rate data
- Expert commentary: Bob McNally (Rapidan Energy / former White House energy advisor); Florence Schmit (Rabobank); Giovanni Staunovo (UBS); Kenneth Goh (UOB Kay Hian, Singapore); Vandana Hari (Vanda Insights, Singapore); Peter Sand (Xeneta); Jakob Larsen (BIMCO)