1. Background and Context
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched a coordinated military campaign designated ‘Operation Epic Fury’ (US) / ‘Roar of the Lion’ (Israel) against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The operation was months in the planning and involved a combination of carrier-launched aircraft, Tomahawk cruise missiles, HIMARS rockets, and low-cost one-way attack drones deployed by Task Force Scorpion Strike in their first combat use. Strikes hit Tehran — including the Supreme Leader’s residential compound, the presidential palace, and the National Security Council building — as well as Qom, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Karaj, and Bushehr.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (85), who had ruled since 1989, was killed in the opening Israeli airstrike while at his office. Iranian state television confirmed his death hours after US President Donald Trump announced it on Truth Social. Iran declared 40 days of national mourning. His daughter, son-in-law, grandchild, and multiple senior officials — including the Defence Minister, IRGC Commander, and National Security Council Secretary — were also killed. Iranian Red Crescent reported over 200 casualties across the country.
| Date | 28 February – 1 March 2026 (ongoing) |
| Initiating parties | United States (Operation Epic Fury) and Israel (Operation Roar of the Lion) |
| Primary stated objective | Prevent Iranian nuclear weapons development; regime change |
| Key casualty | Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader since 1989 |
| Iranian response | IRGC declared ‘most intense offensive operation’ targeting 27 US bases in the Middle East and Israeli military facilities; Strait of Hormuz declared effectively closed by Iranian navy broadcast |
| Regional spill-over | Iranian missile strikes on Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan; attacks on Kuwait and Zayed International airports |
2. Case Study: The Killing of Khamenei and Immediate Aftermath
2.1 The Military Operation
The strikes began at approximately 09:45 Iran Standard Time (01:15 EST) on Saturday 28 February 2026 — a regular working day in Iran. The timing, on the eve of the Jewish festival of Purim (2 March), was noted as symbolically significant by Israeli media. Weeks of escalating rhetoric from the Trump administration had preceded the strikes, with Trump citing Iran’s nuclear programme, support for proxy groups, and threats to American forces as justifications. Notably, Iran had rejected a US offer of ‘free nuclear fuel forever’ in exchange for halting enrichment — a key demand it refused because of its desire to preserve a nuclear weapons option.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth framed the operation as eliminating ‘imminent threats’ and destroying Iran’s missile production capacity and naval assets. Trump described the campaign as ‘massive and ongoing,’ promising strikes would continue ‘throughout the week or as long as necessary.’
2.2 Iranian Retaliation
Iran’s retaliation was immediate and multi-pronged. The IRGC launched missile and drone attacks targeting six Gulf Arab states — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan — all of which host US military bases. Jordan reported intercepting 49 drones and ballistic missiles. The UAE and Kuwait reported strikes on their international airports. Iran also issued a broadcast purportedly from its navy announcing the closure of the Strait of Hormuz to transit traffic, and oil tankers in the region began diverting from the waterway.
Iran’s surviving President Masoud Pezeshkian vowed revenge, pledging that the ‘planners and perpetrators’ would regret their actions. Iran’s Foreign Ministry characterised the strikes as a ‘gross violation’ of national sovereignty and a ‘crime against humanity.’
2.3 Domestic and Diaspora Reactions
Reactions across the Islamic world were swift and volatile. In Karachi, Pakistan, protesters — many from the Shia minority community — stormed the US consulate, with at least eight fatalities reported and 20 injured. Police used tear gas and live fire. A UN office in Skardu (Gilgit-Baltistan) was burned down. Hundreds gathered outside the US consulate in Lahore. In Baghdad, pro-Iranian demonstrators massed outside the Green Zone. Conversely, celebrations were reported in parts of the Iranian diaspora in Los Angeles, London, and among anti-regime Iranians within Tehran itself.
2.4 Constitutional and Political Controversy
The operation generated significant constitutional controversy within the United States. Senator Bernie Sanders, joined by Representatives Ro Khanna and Thomas Massie, accused the Trump administration of launching an ‘illegal, premeditated and unconstitutional war’ without Congressional authorisation. A joint measure was introduced to compel the administration to seek Congressional approval before further operations. The US Constitution vests war-declaration powers in Congress, not the executive, and the War Powers Act constrains presidential military action — though the Trump administration did not seek prior approval.
3. Strategic Outlook
3.1 Scenario Analysis
| Scenario | Probability | Oil Price Impact | Singapore Implication |
| Rapid Regime Collapse | Low–Moderate | +$5–15/bbl short-term; stabilises quickly if Hormuz reopens | Brief disruption; recovery driven by new Iranian government opening to trade |
| Protracted Conflict (Weeks) | Moderate–High | +$20–40/bbl; sustained Hormuz disruption risk | Severe: energy costs, port congestion, supply chain and aviation disruption |
| Hormuz Closure (Prolonged) | Low (but high impact) | +$40–60/bbl; possible $100/bbl spike | Critical: Singapore as refining/trading hub faces LNG price shocks, shipping rerouting |
| Iranian Nuclear Escalation | Low | Extreme market panic; $100+/bbl | Existential regional risk; MAS and government contingency activation |
| Ceasefire / Diplomatic End | Possible in weeks | Prices normalise within days | Markets recover; aviation restores; SIA / Scoot flights resume |
3.2 Key Uncertainties
- Succession to Khamenei: Iran’s constitution requires the Assembly of Experts to appoint a new Supreme Leader. With multiple senior officials killed, this process faces unprecedented institutional disruption. The IRGC’s role in filling the power vacuum is critical and uncertain.
- Strait of Hormuz: Whether Iran can sustain a closure against US naval countermeasures remains unclear. The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is stationed in Bahrain, and the US has historical capability to escort tankers through contested waterways (as during the 1980s Tanker War).
- IRGC offensive capacity: The scale of the US-Israeli strikes on military infrastructure may have significantly degraded Iran’s conventional retaliatory capacity, though missile stocks are substantial.
- Proxy network activation: Houthi forces in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces represent additional axes of retaliation that could escalate the conflict well beyond Iran’s borders.
- Chinese response: With over 80% of Iranian oil going to China, Beijing has strong economic interests in de-escalation. Whether China exerts diplomatic pressure or leverages the crisis for geopolitical advantage remains to be seen.
4. Proposed Solutions and Policy Pathways
4.1 International Diplomatic Framework
The most consequential near-term requirement is an internationally mediated ceasefire. Given Iran’s leadership vacuum, the interlocutor would likely need to engage surviving IRGC commanders and the Assembly of Experts. Oman, which has historically served as a back-channel between Washington and Tehran, is a natural candidate. China and Russia — both with residual influence in Tehran and interest in avoiding prolonged oil disruption — may also be engaged. A UN Security Council emergency resolution, though likely vetoed by the US, could still serve as a diplomatic signalling mechanism.
4.2 Hormuz Stabilisation
The US Fifth Fleet should work with allied navies to escort commercial tankers through the Strait of Hormuz under a reconstituted tanker convoy system analogous to Operation Earnest Will (1987–88). OPEC+ members — principally Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq — should increase production to compensate for Iranian supply disruption and signal market stability. The Trump administration has indicated it may release Strategic Petroleum Reserve stocks if needed, though analysts caution this is a finite buffer.
4.3 Iranian Transition Management
The US stated objective of regime change presents significant long-term challenges. Historical analogies (Iraq 2003, Libya 2011) suggest that decapitation of an authoritarian regime without a credible post-conflict governance plan risks state collapse and prolonged instability. The international community — including the EU, UN, and Arab League — should engage immediately on transition frameworks, including humanitarian corridors, protection of civilian infrastructure, and support for democratic civic groups within Iran.
4.4 Regional Counter-Escalation
Gulf Cooperation Council members and Jordan must be supported in defending against continued Iranian missile salvos. US air and missile defence assets should be reinforced at bases in the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain. Israel should be encouraged to limit strikes to declared military objectives and avoid civilian infrastructure, given the reputational and humanitarian consequences already registered (over 100 children reportedly killed in a school strike near a military base in Minab).
5. Impact on Singapore
5.1 Energy and Fuel Costs
Singapore is one of the world’s largest oil trading and refining hubs. The Strait of Hormuz is not a primary route for Singapore’s energy imports — most of Singapore’s crude arrives from the Middle East via the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait — but a prolonged Hormuz closure or sustained oil price spike would substantially raise refining input costs. Vandana Hari, CEO of Singapore-based Vanda Insights, projected oil prices rising to $80/bbl in a knee-jerk reaction if the conflict continues into Monday’s trading open. Lombard Odier estimated a temporary spike to $100/bbl is plausible, with LNG prices also affected if the strait is blocked. Kenneth Goh of UOB Kay Hian Singapore noted this is a ‘chokepoint story’ with potentially bigger ramifications than Venezuela.
Higher energy costs will flow through to fuel surcharges, electricity tariffs, and transport costs, affecting both households and businesses. Singapore’s Energy Market Authority will need to monitor supply security closely and engage Singaporean LNG import contracts.
5.2 Aviation
Singapore Airlines and Scoot have already cancelled 26 flights to the Middle East as of 1 March 2026. The full-scale closure of Gulf airspace would force rerouting of SIA’s extensive Middle East-Europe hub network over longer polar or African routes, significantly increasing fuel burn and costs. El Al’s suspension of ticket sales to March 21 signals the duration airlines expect the airspace disruption to persist. Changi Airport — one of the world’s busiest transit hubs — will experience passenger disruption and reduced connectivity to the Gulf and wider Middle East.
5.3 Financial Markets
The Singapore Exchange (SGX) will open on Monday into a risk-off environment. Analysts including Alicia Garcia-Herrero (Natixis Asia-Pacific Chief Economist) expect global equities down 1–2% at open, a strengthening US dollar and Japanese yen, and a rush to gold. Singapore’s financial sector, with significant exposure to global equity and fixed income markets, and its role as a regional FX centre, will experience heightened volatility. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) will be monitoring liquidity conditions closely.
5.4 Supply Chain and Trade
Singapore’s role as a global transshipment hub means disruption to Gulf shipping lanes has direct consequences for cargo throughput. If Iran mounts sustained attacks on tanker traffic or disrupts Gulf ports — as it has reportedly struck Kuwait and Zayed airports — shipping insurance costs will surge, tanker rates will spike, and cargo rerouting will add latency and cost to regional supply chains. Singapore’s petrochemical industry on Jurong Island is particularly exposed to sustained crude oil price elevation.
5.5 Diplomatic and Security Considerations
Singapore maintains a scrupulous policy of non-alignment and has longstanding diplomatic relations with both Iran and the United States. Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will face pressure to issue carefully calibrated statements — likely calling for restraint, the protection of civilians, and a return to dialogue — without being perceived as taking sides in what the US frames as a counter-proliferation and self-defence operation. Singapore’s inter-ethnic and inter-religious harmony, particularly given the Shia Muslim dimension of protests in Pakistan and Iraq, requires proactive engagement with the Malay-Muslim community to prevent domestic social tensions.
Singapore citizens in the Middle East — many employed in the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia — should be advised to exercise heightened vigilance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should activate relevant contingency protocols. Singapore’s defence posture, while oriented toward its immediate neighbourhood, may require reassessment of overseas training arrangements in affected countries.
5.6 Summary Impact Matrix
| Sector | Severity (Short-term) | Key Risk |
| Energy / Refining | HIGH | Crude oil price spike; LNG price elevation; refinery margin compression |
| Aviation (SIA / Scoot) | HIGH | Airspace closures; flight cancellations; fuel cost increase |
| Financial Markets (SGX) | MODERATE–HIGH | Equity sell-off; FX volatility; flight to safe-haven assets |
| Shipping / Port | MODERATE–HIGH | Tanker rate surge; insurance costs; cargo diversion |
| Tourism / Hospitality | MODERATE | Reduced inbound arrivals from Middle East and South Asia |
| Diplomatic / Political | MODERATE | Managing non-aligned stance; community cohesion risks |
| Consumer Prices | MODERATE | Fuel surcharges; electricity tariff increases; imported inflation |
6. Conclusion
The killing of Ayatollah Khamenei in Operation Epic Fury represents the most dramatic escalation in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Its consequences are still unfolding. For Singapore, the immediate challenges centre on energy cost management, aviation network continuity, and financial market stability. The longer-term strategic risk lies in prolonged regional instability if Iran fragments into competing power centres, proxy wars intensify across the Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz remains contested.
Singapore’s resilience will depend on: proactive contingency planning by MAS, EMA, and relevant ministries; clear, balanced diplomatic communication; robust engagement with domestic communities; and continued close monitoring of the Hormuz situation. The city-state’s strength lies precisely in its ability to remain a stable, credible, and neutral node in a volatile world — a role that has never been more tested.
Sources
The Straits Times — ‘Protests break out in Pakistan, Iraq over Khamenei’s death,’ 1 March 2026
NPR — ‘Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been killed,’ 28 February 2026
CNN — ‘Live updates: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei killed in US-Israeli strikes,’ 28 February 2026
CNBC — ‘Markets brace for impact following US military strikes against Iran,’ 28 February 2026
The National — ‘US-Iran war: What will the impact be on oil?’ 28 February 2026
Bloomberg — ‘Can Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz?’ 28 February 2026
Wikipedia — ‘2026 Israeli-United States strikes on Iran,’ retrieved 1 March 2026
Al Jazeera Live Blog — US and Israel attack Iran live updates, 28 February 2026
Times of Israel — ‘Iran bombards Israel, Gulf, vowing unprecedented response,’ 1 March 2026
House of Commons Library — ‘Iran: What challenges face the country in 2026?’ retrieved 1 March 2026